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While a bankrupt estate is already in a world of uncertainty, the 
current jurisprudence surrounding rejection of intellectual property 
executory contracts does anything but put those involved at ease. Part 
of the reason for the uncertainty is the fundamentally different policy 
goals of bankruptcy and intellectual property law. 
While an efficient and effective bankruptcy proceeding provides 
insolvent businesses with a way to preserve their business, the need to 
protect intellectual property licenses has become increasingly 
important in recent years. However, balancing these needs has created 
tension.
1
 The ultimate goal in bankruptcy law is to “maximize the 
                                                 
* J.D. candidate, May 2013, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology; Indiana University, Bachelor’s in Psychology, 2009. 
1
 Peter S. Menell, Bankruptcy Treatment of Intellectual Property Assets: An 
Economic Analysis, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 733, 737 (2007). 
1
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value of a failing or failed” entity’s remaining assets.
2
 By providing 
trustees and debtors-in-possession the ability to reject contracts that 




Intellectual property law aims to promote economic growth by 
“encouraging a robust licensing market to exploit the value of 
intellectual creativity.”
4
 This goal is best effectuated through freedom 
of contract and strong enforcement of licensed property rights.
5
 
Although Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code (“the Code”) gives 
the trustee of a bankrupt intellectual property licensor a limited right to 
reject unperformed, or executory, contracts,
6
 this right should not 
eviscerate the licensee’s right to use the property.
7
 Rather, rejection is 
a means to effectuate bankruptcy law’s policy goals while not giving a 
windfall to the bankrupt.
8
 At first blush this may seem obvious, 




In a recent Seventh Circuit decision, Sunbeam Products, Inc. v. 
Chicago American Manufacturing, LLC, Chief Judge Easterbrook held 
that the rejection of a trademark license did not entitle the trustee to 
recapture the property.
10
 However, prior to Sunbeam, many courts had 








 Id.  
6
 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (2006) (providing, in relevant part, “the trustee, subject to 
the court's approval, may . . . reject any executory contract . . . of the debtor”). 
7
 See Sunbeam Prods., Inc. v. Chi. Am. Mfg., LLC, 686 F.3d 372, 377 (7th Cir. 
2012) (holding that rejection does not rescind the contract). 
8
 See id. If, upon rejection, licensees were to lose their right to use the license 
and left with a money damages claim, then it is likely the trustee will not suffer a 
loss from rejecting the contract. As discussed in Part I, it is unlikely the licensee will 
recover very much, if anything from a prepetition claim for damages. 
9
 Compare Sunbeam, 686 F.3d at 377, with Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc. v. 
Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043, 1048 (4th Cir. 1985). 
10
 Sunbeam, 686 F.3d at 378. 
2
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In 1985, the Fourth Circuit, in Lubrizol, prevented a licensee, 
through the debtor’s right to reject an executory contract, from using a 
technology the debtor had previously licensed.
12
 Displeased with this 
result, Congress, in 1988, enacted Section 365(n) of the Code,
13
 which 
gives intellectual property licensees the right to continue using the 
intellectual property it bargained for, even if the representative of the 
bankrupt estate rejects the contract.
14
 As defined by the Code, 
“intellectual property” includes trade secrets, patents, and copyrights, 
but does not include trademarks.
15
 While Congress apparently 
                                                 
11
 756 F.2d 1043 (4th Cir. 1985); E.g., In re Logical Software, Inc., 66 B.R. 
683, 686 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1986). 
12
 Lubrizol, 756 F.2d at 1048. 
13
 S. REP. NO. 100-505, at 3201 (1988). 
14
 11 U.S.C. § 365(n)(1), which provides: 
If the trustee rejects an executory contract under which the debtor is a 
licensor of a right to intellectual property, the licensee under such 
contract may elect-- 
 (A) to treat such contract as terminated by such rejection if such 
rejection by the trustee amounts to such a breach as would entitle the 
licensee to treat such contract as terminated by virtue of its own terms, 
applicable nonbankruptcy law, or an agreement made by the licensee 
with another entity; or 
 (B) to retain its rights (including a right to enforce any exclusivity 
provision of such contract, but excluding any other right under 
applicable nonbankruptcy law to specific performance of such 
contract) under such contract and under any agreement supplementary 
to such contract, to such intellectual property (including any 
embodiment of such intellectual property to the extent protected by 
applicable nonbankruptcy law), as such rights existed immediately 
before the case commenced, for-- 
  (i) the duration of such contract; and 
(ii) any period for which such contract may be extended by the 
licensee as of right under applicable nonbankruptcy law. 
15
 Id. at § 101(35A), which provides:  
 The term “intellectual property” means-- 
  (A) trade secret; 
  (B) invention, process, design, or plant protected under title 35; 
3
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intended to revisit the trademark issue, it never took action; leaving 




Some judges believe that Section 365(n) represents Congressional 
recognition of the validity of the Lubrizol holding, with respect to 
trademarks.
17
 Congress’ choice not to use Section 365(n) to protect 
trademark licensees has led courts to infer, by negative inference, that 
in the event a trademark license is rejected, Lubrizol is controlling.
18
 
Therefore, as the argument goes, because Congress created Section 
365(n) to ensure intellectual property licensees could retain their rights 
after rejection, excluding trademarks suggests Congress was 




However, the legislative history suggests that Congress enacted 
Section 365(n) as an exception to Lubrizol’s interpretation of 
“rejection” under Section 365(g), and Congress chose to simply 
exclude trademarks until more studies could be done.
20
 Creating a split 
in the circuits, the Seventh Circuit held in Sunbeam that excluding 
trademarks from Section 365(n) does not effect how courts should 
                                                                                                                   
  (C) patent application; 
  (D) plant variety; 
  (E) work of authorship protected under title 17; or 
  (F) mask work protected under chapter 9 of title 17;  
 to the extent protected by applicable nonbankruptcy law. 
16
 S. REP. NO. 100-505, at 3204 (1988). 
17
 Sunbeam Prods., Inc. v. Chi. Am. Mfg., LLC 686 F.3d 372, 375 (7th Cir. 
2012). See also e.g., In re Chipwich, Inc., 54 B.R. 427, 431 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985); 
In re Blackstone Potato Chip Co., Inc., 109 B.R. 557, 560 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1990); In 
re Centura Software Corp., 281 B.R. 660, 674 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2002); In re HQ 
Global Holdings, Inc., 290 B.R. 507, 513 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003); In re Old Carco 
LLC, 406 B.R. 180, 211 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
18





 S. REP. NO. 100-505, at 3202-03. 
4
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 8, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 3
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol8/iss1/3




treat them upon rejection
21
 and that rejection does not entitle trustees 
to reclaim the licensed property.
22
 
Part I of this Note discusses the underlying policies of bankruptcy 
and trademark law. Part II reviews case law pertaining to intellectual 
property license rejection rights. Part III analyzes the Sunbeam 
decision and its effect on intellectual property license agreements in 
bankruptcy. Part IV of this Note compares the Seventh Circuit’s view 
of rejection with the Fourth Circuit’s view, and concludes that 
Sunbeam properly analyzed Section 365(g). Finally this note suggests 
that the Supreme Court should settle what it means to reject a 
trademark license agreement. 
 
I. BANKRUPTCY AND TRADEMARK LAW AND THE POLICIES THEY SERVE 
 
A. Bankruptcy Law and Policy 
 
When a corporation files for bankruptcy, the Code “creates an 
estate,”
23
 which is a separate legal entity from the debtor (or bankrupt 
corporation).
24
 In every Chapter 11 bankruptcy the trustee or the 
debtor in possession owes a fiduciary duty to the bankrupt estate.
25
 
Section 365(a) of the Code grants trustees the right, “subject to the 
court’s approval,” to “assume or reject any executory contract . . . of 
the debtor.”
 26
 Courts have “interpreted § 365 as requiring . . . a two-
step inquiry to determine the propriety of rejection: first, whether the 
contract is executory; next, if so, whether its rejection would be 
advantageous to the bankrupt.”
27
 
                                                 
21
 Sunbeam, 686 F.3d at 375. 
22
 Id. at 377. 
23
 11 U.S.C. § 541 (2006). 
24
 Michael T. Andrew, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Understanding 
"Rejection', 59 U. COLO. L. REV. 845, 851 (1988). 
25
 Andrew, supra note 24, at 851-52. 
26
 11 U.S.C. § 365(a). 
27
 Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043, 
1045 (4th Cir. 1985). See also NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 518 
(1984) (where the Court first determined that a collective-bargaining agreement was 
5
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While not explicitly defined in the Code, a contract may be 
considered executory if both parties have not fully performed their 
obligations.
28
 Many courts hold that an executory contract is one 
“under which the obligations of both the bankrupt and the other party 
to the contract are so far unperformed that the failure of either to 
complete the performance would constitute a material breach excusing 
the performance of the other.”
29
  
For example, a farmer may lease machinery to a neighboring 
farmer. The lease may provide that the farmer agrees to loan the 
machinery to the neighbor and to do all repairs on the machine in 
exchange for a monthly rental fee. During the course of the lease, both 
parties have unperformed obligations. A material breach would occur 




Next, to ensure rejection would be advantageous to the 
bankrupt,
31
 courts generally apply some form of the business judgment 
rule.
32
 Rooted in corporate law, “the business judgment rule is a 
common-law standard of judicial review designed to protect the wide 
latitude conferred on a board of directors in handling the affairs of the 
                                                                                                                   
an executory contract); In re Petur U.S.A. Instrument Co., Inc., 35 B.R. 561, 563 
(Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1983); In re Exide Techs., 607 F. 3d 957, 964 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(holding that Exide could not reject an agreement because it was not an executory 
contract). 
28
 In re Crippin, 877 F.2d 594, 596 (7th Cir. 1989). 
29
 Gloria Mfg. Corp. v. Int'l Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, 734 F.2d 1020, 
1022 (4th Cir. 1984) (quoting Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part 




 In re Logical Software, Inc., 66 B.R. 683, 686 (Bankr. D. Mass.1986) 
(quoting Lubrizol Enters., Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043, 
1045 (4th Cir. 1985)). 
32
 See Group of Inst. Investors v. Chi., M., St. P. & P. R. Co., 318 U.S. 523, 
550 (1943). See also NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 526 (1984) 
(holding that in the context of collective-bargaining agreements, a stricter standard 
than “business judgment” should be applied); Andrew, supra note 24, at 895-96. 
6
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 8, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 3
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol8/iss1/3






 Directors who make informed business 
decisions in good faith and who exercise due care are free “from 
liability for honest errors or mistakes in judgment.”
34
 In bankruptcy, 
courts generally accept a bankrupt’s request to reject an executory 
contract “unless it is shown that the bankrupt’s decision was taken in 
bad faith or in gross abuse of the bankrupt’s retained business 
discretion.”
35
 When a debtor’s main asset is a right to license 




Upon rejection, Section 365(g) of the Code treats the estate as if it 
breached the contract prior to petition.
37
 As a result, the “nondebtor 
contracting party has a prepetition general unsecured claim for breach 
of contract damages, one not entitled to administrative priority.”
38
 
A prepetition claim is simply a “right to payment”
39
 by a 
creditor.
40
 These creditors receive, on a pro rata basis, what ever is left 
                                                 
33
 William M. Fletcher, Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Corporations, 3A 
FLETCHER CYC. CORP. § 1036 (2012). 
34
 Miller v. Thomas, 656 N.E.2d 89, 95 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995). See also Fletcher, 
supra note 33. 
35
 Lubrizol, 756 F.2d at 1047. 
36
 E.g., id. 
37
 11 U.S.C. § 365(g) (2006); Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 530; 8B C.J.S. 
Bankruptcy § 915 (2012). 
38
 8B C.J.S. Bankruptcy § 915. See also 11 U.S.C. § 365(g). 
39
 11 U.S.C. § 101(5), which states in full:  
     The term “claim” means— 
 (A) right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to 
judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, 
unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or 
unsecured; or  
 (B) right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such 
breach gives rise to a right to payment, whether or not such right to an 
equitable remedy is reduced to judgment, fixed, contingent, matured, 
unmatured, disputed, undisputed, secured, or unsecured. 
40
 Id. at § 101(10)(A), which provides, “the term ‘creditor’ means [an] entity 
that has a claim against the debtor that arose at the time of or before the order for 
relief concerning the debtor.” 
7
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in the estate after postpetition administrative expenses have been 
paid.
41
 Postpetition administrative expenses include, among other 
things, “the actual, necessary costs and expenses of preserving the 
estate.”
42
 Since postpetition administrative expenses receive priority 
over prepetition claims, and oftentimes must be paid in full, creditors 
filing prepetition claims rarely recover the full amount.
43
 
However, the implications of this “breach” are not entirely clear.
44
 
While the Code states that rejection “constitutes a breach” of a 
contract,
45
 courts have interpreted rejection as anything from a 
“release”
46
 “of contract obligations”
47
 to something tantamount to 
rescission.
48











                                                 
41
 Laura B. Bartell, Straddle Obligations Under Prepetition Contracts: 
Prepetition Claims, Postpetition Claims or Administrative Expenses?, 25 EMORY 
BANKR. DEV. J. 39, 39 (2008).  
42
 11 U.S.C. § 503(b). 
43
 Bartell, supra note 41. 
44
 See Sunbeam Prods., Inc. v. Chi. Am. Mfg., LLC, 686 F.3d 372, 378 (7th 
Cir. 2012). 
45
 11 U.S.C. § 365(g) (which provides “the rejection of an executory contract 
or unexpired lease of the debtor constitutes a breach of such contract or lease”). 
46
 NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 528 (1984). 
47
 Andrew, supra note 24, at 847. 
48
 See Lubrizol Enters., Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043, 
1048 (4th Cir. 1985) (where rejection ultimately allowed the debtor to reclaim 
technology it had previously licensed the use of).  
49
 Compare Sunbeam, 686 F.3d at 377 (holding that rejection merely frees the 
licensor from any further contract obligations, but does not entitle the rejecting party 
to reclaim the property), with Lubrizol, 756 F.2d at 1048 (holding that rejection 
entitles the rejecting party to recapture the use of the licensed property). 
8
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B. Trademark Law and Policy 
 
A trademark is a form of intellectual property that represents the 
user’s brand name.
50
 Trademarks can take the form of a “word, name, 
symbol, device, or any combination, used or intended to be used to 
identify and distinguish the goods/services of one seller or provider 
from those of others, and to indicate the source of the 
goods/services.”
51
 Trademarks serve a dual purpose: “to protect both 
consumers from deception and confusion over trade symbols and to 
protect the plaintiff's infringed trademark as property.”
52
  
Unlike a patent or copyright, a trademark is not property in the 
traditional sense.
53
 A trademark symbolizes the goodwill of an existing 
business, and for that reason has no independent property value.
54
 
While a patent can be licensed for the sole use of the patent,
55
 a 
trademark flows with the business it is associated with.
56
  
A trademark’s value is based in part on the value of the underlying 
business’ goodwill.
57
 Therefore, trademarks encourage companies to 
produce high quality goods and services and to “invest in building the 
‘goodwill’ surrounding a brand name.”
58
 While this function of 
trademarks promotes innovation, it is the distinctiveness, not the 
inventiveness, which determines whether a trademark is protected.
59
  
                                                 
50
 What is a trademark or servicemark?, UNITED STATES PATENT AND 
TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/trademarks/index.jsp (last updated Oct. 
24, 2012). 
51
 UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 50. 
52
 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition, 1 
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2:2 (4th ed.) (2012). 
53
 See Hanover Star Milling Co., v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 412 (1916). See 
also McCarthy, supra note 52, at § 2:15. 
54
 Sugar Busters LLC v. Brennan, 177 F.3d 258, 265 (5th Cir. 1999). 
55
 Mennell, supra note 1, at 741. 
56
 Id. at 750. 
57
 Hanover, 240 U.S. at 412. 
58
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Unless a trademark license is an executory contract, it may not be 
rejected.
60
 As discussed above, an executory contract requires that 
both parties have material, unperformed obligations.
61
 A typical 
trademark license is executory because the “licensor has continuing 
quality control obligations and the licensee typically has payment, 
reporting, marketing, and other continuing performance obligations.”
62
 
For example, in In re HQ Global Holdings, Inc., the agreement at 
issue required the franchisee to maintain operational standards in at 
least one HQ center and to pay a monthly royalty to the debtors.
63
 In 
addition, the debtor had granted the franchisee exclusive use of HQ 
trademarks in certain territories.
64
 Therefore, the debtor had a 
continued obligation to refrain from using the trademark in the 
franchisee’s territories.
65
 The court held that taken together, the 
agreement was an executory contract because at the time the 







Before Congress enacted Section 365(n), intellectual property 
licensees, assuming Lubrizol was correctly decided, were at the mercy 
of their bankrupt licensor.
67
 Under Lubrizol, a debtor could use its 
rejection power to reclaim licensed intellectual property “in an effort 
to negotiate better terms.”
68
 If a debtor can simply rescind an 
                                                 
60
 See In re Exide Techs., 607 F.3d 957, 964 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding that 
because the agreement did “not contain at least one ongoing material obligation” for 
the licensee, it was not an executory contract, and thus, Exide could not reject it).  
61
 McCarthy, supra note 52, at § 18:30. 
62
 Mennell, supra note 1, at 764. 
63








 See Lubrizol Enters., Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043, 
1048 (4th Cir. 1985). 
68
 Menell, supra note 1, at 768 (assuming Lubrizol was correctly decided). 
10
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unfavorable license agreement, businesses that rely on licensing could 
be put out of business.
69
  
While this interpretation of rejection has serious consequences 
once rejection has been approved, it equally affects bargaining power 
at the negotiation stage. Young companies, for example, licensing their 
intellectual property are at a bargaining disadvantage because there 
will always be the concern that the young company may enter 
bankruptcy and the licensee will lose its right to the intellectual 
property. 
Congress, and even the Lubrizol court, agreed that this “would 
have a chilling effect on the development and licensing of intellectual 
property.”
70
 As a result, Congress enacted Section 365(n) to protect 
intellectual property licensees.
71
 However, Congress excluded 
trademarks from Section 365(n), leaving it up to the courts to 




II. RELEVANT CASE LAW 
 
A. Pre-Section 365(n) 
 
Before the enactment of Section 365(n) of the Code, the Fourth 
Circuit in, Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, 
Inc., broadly construed a debtor’s power to reject an executory 
contract.
73
 The court held that rejection relinquished the licensee’s 
                                                 
69
 See id. at 768-9. 
70
 Patrick Law, Intellectual Property Licenses and Bankruptcy – Has the 
IPLBA Thawed the “Chilling Effects” of Lubrizol v. Richmond Metal Finishers?, 99 
COM. L.J. 261, 261 (1994). 
71
 S. REP. NO. 100-505, at 3204 (1988). 
72
 Id. (Congress invites bankruptcy courts to use their equitable powers to 
provide, if any, protection to trademark licensees).  
73
 See Sunbeam Products, Inc. v. Chicago Am. Mfg., LLC, 686 F.3d 372, 377 
(7th Cir. 2012) (where the court notes “[s]cholars uniformly criticize, Lubrizol” for 
“confus[ing] rejection with the use of an avoiding power”). 
11
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This is a peculiar decision in light of how we typically think of 
contract breaches. If a car dealership agrees to provide the lessee with 
free auto service, but later breaches this agreement by refusing to offer 
this service, the dealership cannot force the lessee to return the car. 
Breach generally does not repudiate the contract, but rather, courts will 




In Lubrizol, Richmond Metal Finishers (“RMF”) developed a 
valuable metal coating process.
76
 RMF arranged to sell the technology 
to Lubrizol in exchange for a percentage of the sales realized as a 
result of the technology.
77
 The agreement was non-exclusive and RMF 
agreed to defend Lubrizol in any claims of infringement.
78
 
RMF filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, and in doing so, intended to 
reject the Lubrizol technology agreement.
79
 In spite of the bankruptcy 
court’s approval of RMF’s motion for rejection,
80
 the district court 
reversed.
81
 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy 
court’s decision allowing RMF to reject the Lubrizol agreement.
82
  
                                                 
74
 See Lubrizol Enters., Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043, 
1048 (4th Cir. 1985). 
75
 24 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
CONTRACTS § 64:2 (4th ed.). See also Sunbeam, 686 F.3d at 377. 
76
 In re Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 38 B.R. 341, 342 (E.D. Va. 1984) 






 Lubrizol, 756 F.2d at 1045 (RMF hoped that rejecting the Lubrizol contract 
would allow it to capitalize on the proprietary metal coating technology.). 
80
 Id. (The bankruptcy court concluded that the Lubrizol contract was 
executory and rejection would “be advantageous to the bankrupt.”). 
81
 Id. at 1046 (The district court reversed on the grounds that the Lubrizol 
contract was not executory and that rejection did not represent sound business 
judgment.). 
82
 Id. at 1048. 
12
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In order to reject the Lubrizol agreement, RMF had to show that 
the agreement was an executory contract, and that “rejection would be 
advantageous to the bankrupt.”
83
 The court held that the licensing 
agreement was an executory contract because, among other duties and 
obligations, Lubrizol had a duty to pay RMF royalties for the use of 
the process, while RMF had the continuing obligation to notify 
Lubrizol if it further licensed the technology.
84
 
The next issue was whether rejection would benefit RMF.
85
 
RMF’s metal coating process was its most valuable asset.
86
 Requiring 
RMF to meet its continued obligations with Lubrizol would hinder its 
ability to further license or sell this process.
87
 Without considering the 
adverse effect upon Lubrizol, the court found it was within RMF’s 
sound business judgment to reject the license agreement.
88
  
While the court recognized that “rejection in this and comparable 
cases could have a general chilling effect upon the willingness of such 
parties to contract at all with businesses in possible financial 
difficulty,” the court nonetheless held rejection was proper.
89
 The court 
refused to indulge these equitable considerations because Congress 
clearly allowed debtors to reject executory contacts, except for two 
explicit exceptions: “union members under collective bargaining 
contracts . . . and to lessees of real property.”
90
  
Without offering significant analysis, the court cursorily 
concluded that by rejecting an executory contract, the trustee had a 
right to regain control of the licensed property.
91
 According to the 
                                                 
83




 Id. at 1046. 
86








 Id. at 1048. 11 U.S.C. § 365(h) (2006). NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 
U.S. 513, 519. 
91
 Lubrizol, 756 F.2d at 1048. See also Sunbeam Products, Inc. v. Chicago Am. 
Mfg., LLC, 686 F.3d 372, 377 (7th Cir. 2012) (“Lubrizol itself devoted scant 
attention to the question [sic] whether rejection cancels a contract”). 
13
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court, Section 365(g) merely allows the non-bankrupt party to recover 
money damages.
92
 Furthermore, it found that Lubrizol could not 




In the three years between the Lubrizol decision and the 
enactment of Section 365(n), other cases similarly held that rejection 
prevented the non-debtor from using the licensed property.
94
 For 
example, in In re Petur U.S.A. Instrument Co., the bankruptcy court 
held that the bankrupt estate could not reject an executory contract 
because the potential harm to the non-debtor was disproportionately 
high compared to the benefit to the bankrupt estate.
95
 The court 
reasoned that rejection would put the non-debtor out of business, 
suggesting rejection would prevent the non-debtor from any further 
use of the license.
96
 
However, In re Select-A-Seat Corp., decided before the enactment 
of Section 365(n), held that rejection only applies to the executory part 
of the contract, and the licensee may continue using the property.
97
 
The court stated that “rejection can cancel covenants requiring future 
performances by the debtor,” but the license “cannot be summarily 
terminated.”
98
 These cases highlight the varied opinions that courts 




                                                 
92
 Lubrizol, 756 F.2d at 1048. 11 U.S.C. § 365(g) (“[T]he rejection of an 
executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor constitutes a breach of such 
contract or lease.”). 
93
 Lubrizol, 756 F.2d at 1048. 
94
 In re Petur U.S.A. Instrument Co., Inc., 35 B.R. 561, 563 (Bankr. W.D. 
Wash. 1983). See also e.g., In re Chipwich, Inc., 54 B.R. 427, 431 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
1985) (holding that “by rejecting the two licenses the debtor will deprive [the 
licensee] of its right to use the ‘Chipwich’ trademark for its products”). 
95
 In re Petur U.S.A. Instrument Co., Inc., 35 B.R. at 563-64. 
96
 Id. at 563. 
97
 625 F.2d 290, 292 (9th Cir. 1980). 
98
 Id. at 293. 
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B. Enactment of Section 365(n)  
 
Concerned with the impact Lubrizol would have on intellectual 
property licenses, Congress enacted Section 365(n) in 1988 to prevent 
“licensors from rejecting executory contracts.”
99
 As a remedial 
protection for licensees, Congress intended Section 365(n) to clarify 
that intellectual property licenses cannot be unilaterally terminated by 
the rejection of a license.
100
  
Section 365(n) provides licensees with two options in the event of 
rejection.
101
 First, the licensee may treat rejection as a breach of 
contract and seek damages as a creditor.
102
 Alternatively, the licensee 
may retain the rights it had under the agreement before the licensor 
filed for bankruptcy.”
103
 With respect to intellectual property other 
than trademarks, allowing the licensee to continue using the 
intellectual property imposes no additional burdens on the trustee, 
while at the same time, avoids the chilling effect Congress feared.
104
 
However, the same cannot be said for trademarks. 
Trademarks require parties on both sides of the license to perform 
to some extent.
105
 If Section 365(n) included trademarks, a licensee’s 
ability to retain its rights under the agreement could put substantial 
burdens on the bankrupt estate. Since trademark licenses “depend to a 
large extent on control of the quality of the products or services sold 
by the licensee,” Congress excluded trademarks from the definition of 
intellectual property as it pertains to Section 365(n) until more studies 
                                                 
99
 Law, supra note 70. 
100
 S. REP. NO., 100-505 at 3200 (1988). 
101
 Law, supra note 70, at 266.  
102
 See 11 U.S.C. § 365. Law, supra note 70, at 266 (which notes that this 
option was available before Congress enacted § 365(n)). Under Lubrizol, this would 
mean the licensee loses its right to use the intellectual property. Lubrizol, 756 F.2d at 
1048. 
103




 Menell, supra note 1, at 750 (For example, “any licenses of trademarks--
whether exclusive or nonexclusive--must be supervised by the trademark owner in 
order to avoid abandoning the mark.”). 
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 Although Congress clearly intended to revisit this 




III. SUNBEAM DECISION  
 
 In Sunbeam Products, Inc. v. Chicago Am. Mfg., LLC, the 
Seventh Circuit analyzed the effect of rejecting a trademark license 
agreement.
108
 In addition, the court addressed the broader issue of 
rejection as it applies to all intellectual property.
109
 The Seventh 
Circuit took this as an opportunity to determine whether Lubrizol 




A. The Facts 
 
Lakewood Engineering & Manufacturing Co. manufactured and 
sold, among other products, box fans.
111
 In 2008, while already losing 
money, Lakewood contracted its manufacturing out to Chicago 
American Manufacturing (“CAM”).
112
 Lakewood authorized CAM to 
make box fans using Lakewood’s patents and allowed it to adhere 
Lakewood’s trademark to the fans.
113
 In addition, the contract gave 
CAM the right to sell the remaining 2009 inventory if Lakewood was 
unable to purchase the fans.
114
 
                                                 
106




 686 F.3d 372 (7th Cir. 2012) (The district court certified a direct appeal 
under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2)(A) by Sunbeam Products, doing business as Jarden 




 Id. at 376. 
111
 In re Lakewood Eng’g & Mfg. Co., Inc., 459 B.R. 306, 310 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ill. 2011) aff’d sub nom. Sunbeam Prods., Inc. v. Chi. Am. Mfg., LLC, 686 F.3d 372 
(7th Cir. 2012) cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 790 (U.S. 2012). 
112




 Sunbeam, 686 F.3d at 376. 
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The following year, and merely months into the contract, 
Lakewood’s creditors filed an involuntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy 
petition against it.
115
 In an effort to liquidate Lakewood, Sunbeam 
Products bought Lakewood’s assets, which included its intellectual 
property.
116
 The court appointed trustee rejected the CAM executory 
contract, but CAM continued to make and sell the Lakewood fans.
117
  
As a result, Sunbeam filed an adversary action against CAM, 
claiming it did not have any right to use Lakewood’s patents and 
trademarks.
118
 The bankruptcy court upheld the contract on equitable 
grounds.
119
 The bankruptcy court reasoned that since CAM had 
already manufactured a significant number of fans with the Lakewood 






While not reversing the bankruptcy judge’s ruling, the Seventh 
Circuit found the ruling untenable because it couched the decision in 
equity.
121
 The Seventh Circuit wrote that judges should not rule 
contrary to the Code merely because they believe enforcing the Code 
would be inequitable.
122
 Equity takes on different meanings, in 
different situations, for different judges. While some may think equity 
favors licensees by allowing them to rely on the strength of the 
                                                 
115
 In re Lakewood, 459 B.R. at 320. 
116
 Id. at 325. 
117
 Id. at 327-28. 
118
 Id. at 328. 
119
 Id. at 345 (By couching its decision in equity, the bankruptcy judge did not 
need to determine whether trademarks may be rejected under §§ 365(a) and (n)). 
120
 See id. at 343-47. 
121
 Sunbeam, 686 F.3d at 376. In reference to the recent Supreme Court 
decision, RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, Chief Judge 
Easterbrook stated, “arguments based on views about the purposes behind the Code, 
and wise public policy, cannot be used to supersede the Code’s provisions.” Id. 
122
 Id. at 375. 
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license, others find equity to favor the creditors, because terminating 
IP licenses allows the debtor to recover more of its claim.
123
 
However, according to Sunbeam, it only matters what the Code 
says, not where equity lies.
124
 By applying “well established principles 
of statutory construction,”
125
 Sunbeam concluded that Section 365(g) 
should not be read so expansively that rejection eviscerates the 






Chief Judge Easterbrook held that CAM may continue using the 
Lakewood trademarks, despite Lakewood’s rejection of the licensing 
agreement.
127
 The court reasoned that, although Congress excluded 
trademarks from its definition of intellectual property,
128
 it did not 
intend to approve of the principles held in Lubrizol.
129
 In fact, 
Congress intended for Section 365(n) to act as a way for intellectual 
property licensees to retain possession and use of licenses, despite 
Lubrizol suggesting a licensor could reclaim the property.
130
  
While Section 365(n) protects intellectual property licensees, as it 
is defined in the Code, it is Sunbeam’s interpretation of Section 365(g) 
that protects trademark licensees.
131
 However, Section 365(g) only 
protects trademarks because Section 365(n) leaves trademarks 
                                                 
123
 Id. at 375-76. 
124
 Id. at 376. Chief Judge Easterbrook goes on to quote RadLAX, “The 
Bankruptcy Code standardizes an expansive (and sometimes unruly) area of law, and 
it is our obligation to interpret the Code clearly and predictably using well 
established principles of statutory construction.” RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. 
Amalgamated Bank,132 S.Ct. 2065, 2073 (2012). 
125
 RadLAX, 132 S.Ct. at 2073. 
126
 Sunbeam, 686 F.3d. at 376-78. 
127
 Id. at 378. 
128
 11 U.S.C. § 101(35A) (2006). 
129
 Sunbeam, 686 F.3d at 375. See S. REP. NO. 100-505, at 3200 (1988). 
130
 See S. REP. NO. 100-505, at 3200. 
131
 See generally Sunbeam, 686 F.3d at 377. 
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 This principle is supported by Judge Ambro’s 
concurring opinion in In re Exide Technologies, where he stipulated 




Although the crux of the Exide opinion was whether “a perpetual, 
exclusive, royalty-free license to use the Exide trademark in the 
industrial battery business” was an executory contract, Judge Ambro, 
in his concurring opinion, shed light on how to handle trademarks with 
regard to Section 365(n).
134
 “For years, it was held that, while [Section 
365(n)] covered licenses of most types of intellectual property, by 
negative implication, it did not cover trademark licenses.”
135
 
Therefore, according to these courts, Lubrizol’s holding would control, 
and could prevent trademark licensees from using the trademark after 
rejection.
136
 However, Judge Ambro concluded that courts should use 
Section 365, coupled with “their equitable powers,” to further the 
                                                 
132
 Id. at 375. Chief Judge Easterbrook provided that “[s]ome bankruptcy 
judges have inferred from the omission [of trademarks from Section 365(n)] that 
Congress codified Lubrizol with respect to trademarks, but an omission is just an 
omission.” Id. 
133
 Id. (citing In re Exide Techs., 607 F.3d 957, 966-967 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(Ambro, J., concurring)). 
134
 In re Exide, 607 F.3d at 961, 965 (The court held that Exide could not reject 
the license because it was not an executory contract.). 
135
 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition, 1 
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 18:30 (4th ed.) (2012) 
(citing In re Centura Software Corp., 281 B.R. 660, 669-670 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 
2002) (“Consistent with the statutory language, 365(n)'s legislative history also 
explicitly states that ‘the bill does not address the rejection of executory trademark, 
trade name or service mark licenses.’”)). See also In re Dynamic Tooling Systems, 
Inc., 349 B.R. 847, 856 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2006) (“Hantover's license to use DTS's 
trademarks and service marks is not protected by § 365(n) at all because trademarks 
are not ‘intellectual property’ as that term is defined in the Code, § 101(35A)”); In re 
Old Carco LLC, 406 B.R. 180, 211 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 2009) (“Trademarks are not 
‘intellectual property’ … [and therefore] rejection of licenses by [a] licensor deprives 
[the] licensee of [the] right to use [a] trademark but [the] licensee has [an] allowable 
claim for damages for breach of contract”) (internal citation omitted); In re Exide, 
607 F.3d at 966 (Ambro, J., concurring). 
136
 In re Exide, 607 F.3d at 966 (Ambro, J., concurring). 
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bankrupt licensor’s goal of maximizing its assets, while not “let[ting] a 




ii. Effect of Rejection 
 
Section 365(g) treats a rejected executory contract as a breach of 
that contract.
138
 Therefore, if a trustee rejects an executory contract 
under section 365(a), the non-debtor has the same rights as if the 
trustee merely breached the contract outside of bankruptcy.
139
 In other 
words, the non-debtor may recover damages for the breach. Therefore, 
because Lakewood’s rejection of the CAM license agreement “did not 
abrogate CAM’s contractual rights,” the Seventh Circuit held that 
CAM may continue using the Lakewood trademarks.
140
  
The Sunbeam decision has created a circuit split, yet after all 
active judges had an opportunity to review the opinion, none favored a 
hearing en banc.
141
 This could mean that all the other judges agreed 
with the Sunbeam decision or that they did not think the issue was 












                                                 
137
 Id. at 967. 
138
 11 U.S.C. § 365(g) (2006). 
139
 Sunbeam Prods., Inc. v. Chi. Am. Mfg., LLC, 686 F.3d 372, 376-77 (7th 
Cir. 2012). 
140




 7th Cr. R. 40(e) (Any proposed opinion that creates a circuit split must be 
circulated among all active judges and only after a majority of the judges vote 
against a hearing en banc can the opinion be published.). 
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C. Sunbeam’s Effect on Bankruptcy Law 
 
i. Sunbeam Redefines Section 365(g) and the Implications of 
Rejecting an Executory Contract 
 
The Seventh Circuit is the first court of appeals to directly 
repudiate the Lubrizol decision.
143
 The decision provides a second 
interpretation of Section 365(g) and the implications of rejecting an 
executory contract.
144
 Trademark licensees will cite Sunbeam for the 
proposition that, despite rejection, Section 365(g) does not rescind the 




In addition, Sunbeam may have some applicability to other forms 
of intellectual property not included in the Code’s definition.
146
 
Sunbeam was not concerned with the underlying form of intellectual 
property, except to the extent that it was excluded from Section 
365(n).
147
 Because the form of intellectual property was not a 
determinative factor, there is no reason a licensee of a trade name, 
service mark, or foreign intellectual property should not invoke 
Sunbeam in support of continued use after rejection.
148
 Had Sunbeam 
narrowed its holding to only trademarks, then its interpretation of 
                                                 
143
 Sunbeam, 686 F.3d at 376 (“No other court of appeals has agreed with 
Lubrizol – or for that matter disagreed with it. Exide, the only other appellate case in 
which the subject came up, was resolved on the ground that the contract was not 
executory and therefore could not be rejected.”). 
144
 Compare id. at 377, with Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc. v. Richmond Metal 
Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043, 1047 (4th Cir. 1985). 
145
 Sunbeam, 686 F.3d. at 378. However, while the licensee may continue 
using the trademark, the unfilled obligations of the representative of the bankrupt’s 
estate are converted into damages. Further, “nothing in this process implies that any 
rights of the [non-rejecting party] have been vaporized.” Id. at 377. 
146
 Marc Fineman & Jonathan Friedland, Seventh Circuit: Bankruptcy Code’s 
Definition of ‘Intellectual Property’ Does Not Include Trademarks, 29 THE BANKR. 
STRATEGIST, Oct. 2012, at 1, 5. 
147
 See Sunbeam, 686 F.3d at 375. (which after confirming that Section 365(n) 
excludes trademarks, makes no mention of trademarks in its analysis). 
148
 Fineman, supra note 146, at 5. 
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rejection under 365(g) may not apply to these other forms of 
intellectual property. 
 
ii. While Trademark Licensees Can Do Without Section 365(n), Other 
Intellectual Property Licensees Cannot Forget About It 
 
Following the Sunbeam decision, Section 365(n), to some extent, 
is meaningless in the Seventh Circuit for trademark licenses. This 
section leaves trademarks unaffected because “an omission is just an 
omission.”
149
 Unable to invoke Section 365(n) for protection, 
trademark licensees must rely on Sunbeam’s interpretation of Section 
365(g). While this benefits trademark licensees, patent and copyright 
licensees must continue to adhere to the terms of Section 365(n).
150
 
Licensees that fall under Section 365(n) may retain the rights 
gained under the agreement, but not without paying for it.
151
 For 
example, licensees must continue making royalty payments and waive 
“any right of setoff it may have with respect to such contract under 
this title or applicable nonbankruptcy law.”
152
 Therefore, it would be 
incorrect to claim that Sunbeam makes Section 365(n) wholly 
insignificant. 
One can see why, depending on the nature of the intellectual 
property, this decision upsets certain licensees. Licensees subject to 
Section 365(n) in its current form will likely balk at the decision 
because while trademark licensees can retain the rights granted in the 
license, other intellectual property licensees must pay for the same 
retention. Expect licensees covered by Section 365(n) fight for 
reliance on Section 365(g), and therefore hope not to be subject to the 




                                                 
149
 Sunbeam, 686 F.3d at 375. 
150
 See 11 U.S.C. § 365(n) (2006). 
151
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IV. COMPETING VIEWS 
 
Now that there is a clear circuit split, it is only a matter of time 
before the Supreme Court reviews what happens to the non-debtor’s 
property after a representative of the bankrupt estate rejects an 
executory contract or unexpired lease. On one hand, Lubrizol from the 
Fourth Circuit held that with subsequent rejection, the non-debtor 
party is stripped of the property and left with only a money damages 
claim for breach of contract.
153
 On the other hand, the recently decided 
Seventh Circuit case, Sunbeam, held that rejection does not give the 




A. Rejection as an Avoiding Power 
 
The Seventh Circuit found that Lubrizol missed the mark when it 
equated rejection with an avoiding power. 
155
 While the Code entitles 
trustees to rescind certain contracts through the use of various 
avoiding powers,
156
 rejection under Section 365 is not one of them.
157
 
“Avoiding-power rejection” is most often applied to the termination of 
real property leases and technology licenses.
158
 While Congress has 
since made clear that rejecting a real property lease “has no avoiding-
power effect,”
159
 a brief explanation may help explain Lubrizol’s 
reasoning. 
Section 365(h) of the Code “provides that despite the rejection of 
a real property lease in a lessor’s bankruptcy, the lessee may remain in 
                                                 
153
 Lubrizol Enters., Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043, 
1048 (4th Cir. 1985). 
154
 Sunbeam, 686 F.3d at 377. 
155
 Id. See Andrew, supra note 24, at 916. 
156
 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 545, 547-48 & 553 (2006). 
157
 Sunbeam, 686 F.3d at 377 (“[R]ejection is not ‘the functional equivalent of 
a rescission, rendering void the contract and requiring that the parties be put back in 
the positions they occupied before the contract was formed.’” (quoting Thompkins v. 
Lil’ Joe Records, Inc., 476 F.3d 1294, 1306 (11th Cir. 2007))). 
158
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possession for the term of the lease and any enforceable renewals, 
continuing to pay rent but offsetting any damages caused by 
nonperformance of the lessor’s covenants under the lease.”
160
 Like 
Section 365(n), this provision allows the non-debtor to retain 
possession of the property.
161
 
Lubrizol alludes to the possibility that by enacting Section 365(h) 
Congress contemplated rejection as having an avoiding power 
effect.
162
 Had Congress envisioned rejection as simply freeing the 
debtor from any further obligations, while allowing the non-debtor to 
remain in possession of the property, could it not have stated so? 
Instead, Congress enacted exemptions as problems arose.
163
 Therefore, 
Lubrizol could be defended on the grounds that Congress interpreted 
rejection as providing something similar to an avoiding power; and 
additionally, because Section 365(n) had not been enacted, it was 
                                                 
160
 Id. 11 U.S.C. § 365(h)(1)(A), which provides: 
 If the trustee rejects an unexpired lease of real property under which 
the debtor is the lessor and-- 
 (i) if the rejection by the trustee amounts to such a breach as would 
entitle the lessee to treat such lease as terminated by virtue of its 
terms, applicable nonbankruptcy law, or any agreement made by the 
lessee, then the lessee under such lease may treat such lease as 
terminated by the rejection; or 
 (ii) if the term of such lease has commenced, the lessee may retain 
its rights under such lease (including rights such as those relating to 
the amount and timing of payment of rent and other amounts payable 
by the lessee and any right of use, possession, quiet enjoyment, 
subletting, assignment, or hypothecation) that are in or appurtenant to 
the real property for the balance of the term of such lease and for any 
renewal or extension of such rights to the extent that such rights are 
enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law. 
161
 Andrew, supra note 24, at 902-03. S. REP. NO. 100-505, at 3203 (1988) 
(“The bill provides for treatment of intellectual property licenses under Section 365 
in a manner that parallels generally the treatment of real estate leases in the existing 
provision of Section 365(h)(1).”). 
162
 Lubrizol Enters., Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043, 
1048 (4th Cir. 1985). 
163
 See S. REP. NO. 100-505, at 3204 (1988), which states, “the bill is intended 
to respond to a particular problem arising out of recent court decisions under Section 
365.” 
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proper to prevent the licensee from further use of the technology 
license. 
Many lower courts did not challenge this holding, and thus have 
prevented trademark licensees from using the license after rejection.
164
 
For example, in In re HQ Global Holdings, Inc. the court held that a 
franchisee loses its right to use the trademark upon rejection.
165
 The 
court reasoned that because Congress excluded trademarks from 
Section 365(n), Lubrizol controls, and upon rejection, the franchisee 
may no longer use the trademark.
166
  
In addition, the court in In re Centura Software Corp. held that 
rejection amounted to rescission because numerous authorities, 
including cases before and after Congress enacted Section 365(n), 




Jurisdictions that follow Lubrizol would allow representatives of a 
bankrupt estate to reject unprofitable trademark license agreements 
and to shop around for something better. Worse yet, rejection could be 
used as a negotiating sword.
168
 Licensees relying on the use of the 
license will be forced to renegotiate their agreement, lest they may 
otherwise lose the right to use the trademark. While Section 365(n) 
addresses the chilling effect that a Lubrizol-like decision creates with 
regard to copyrights and patents, trademarks are left in the cold. 
Ostensibly, trademark licensees will fight tooth and nail to avoid an 
interpretation of Section 365(g) that follows Lubrizol. 
 
 
                                                 
164
 See e.g., In re Chipwich, Inc., 54 B.R. 427, 431 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985); In 
re Blackstone Potato Chip Co., Inc., 109 B.R. 557, 562 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1990); In re 
Centura Software Corp., 281 B.R. 660, 674 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2002); In re HQ 
Global Holdings, Inc., 290 B.R. 507, 513 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003); In re Old Carco 
LLC, 406 B.R. 180, 211 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
165




 In re Centura, 281 B.R. at 673. 
168
 In re Exide Techs., 607 F. 3d 957, 967 (3d Cir. 2010) (Judge Ambro, 
concurring). 
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The Seventh Circuit took a wholly different view in Sunbeam. In 
Sunbeam, Chief Judge Easterbrook stated that rejection did not entitle 
the trustee or debtor to reclaim the licensed property.
169
 In Sunbeam, 
the court reasoned that just as breach outside of bankruptcy does not 
prevent a licensee from using the bargained for intellectual property,
170
 




While some courts have followed the Lubrizol interpretation, 
others have held that rejection does not extinguish the underlying 
obligation.
172
 In In re Continental Airlines, pilots for Continental 
Airlines brought a claim for furlough pay after Continental filed for 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy and rejected its collective bargaining 
agreement.
173
 The Fifth Circuit held that because Section 365(g) 
specifically uses the term “breach,” rejection “does not invalidate the 
contract, or treat the contract as if it does not exist.”
174
 One cannot 
breach a contract that does not exist.
175
 Therefore, if, upon rejection, 
Continental could treat the collective bargaining agreement as if it did 
not exist, then the pilots would not have a claim for damages, which is 
clearly provided pursuant to Section 502(g) of the Code.
176
 
                                                 
169
 Sunbeam Prods., Inc. v. Chi. Am. Mfg., LLC, 686 F.3d 372, 377 (7th Cir. 
2012).  
170
 Id. at 376. 
171
 Id. at 377. 
172
 Although not interpreting Section 365(g) in the same context as Lubrizol 
and Sunbeam, courts have interpreted Section 365(g) in other contexts. See, e.g., In 
re Austin Dev. Co., 19 F.3d 1077, 1082 (5th Cir. 1994); O’Neil v. Cont’l Airlines, 
Inc. (In re Cont’l Airlines), 981 F.2d 1450, 1459 (5th Cir. 1993); Kopolow v. P.M. 
Holding Corp. (In re Modern Textile, Inc.), 900 F.2d 1184, 1191 (8th Cir. 1990); 
Leasing Serv. Corp. v. First Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 826 F.2d 434, 436 (6th Cir. 1987). 
173
 In re Cont’l Airlines, 981 F.2d at 1451. 
174




 11 U.S.C. § 502(g)(1) (2006) which provides:  
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Furthermore, in In re Modern Textile, Inc., the Eighth Circuit held 
that rejection of an unexpired lease did not release the debtor of its 
legal obligation, but rather functioned “as a breach of an existing and 
continuing legal obligation of the debtor.”
177
 
While trademark licensees are obviously happy about the 
Sunbeam decision, licensees currently protected under Section 365(n) 
may be upset. Under Sunbeam, trademark licensees have an unfair 
advantage. By interpreting Section 365(g) as Sunbeam did, trademark 
licensees will receive the same protections that other intellectual 
property licensees currently receive under 365(n). Yet unlike other 
intellectual property licensees, trademark licensees do not need to 
comply with the terms of Section 365(n) in order to continue using the 
license.
178
 Intellectual property licensees may view this outcome as a 
windfall for trademark licensees. While the Supreme Court will likely 
review what it means to reject an executory contract, treating 
trademarks differently from other intellectual property may prompt 




Courts have struggled with the idea of rejecting executory 
contracts since the turn of the century.
179
 While it is understood that 
rejecting amounts to a “breach,” exactly what it means to breach an 
executory contract is not always clear.
180
 Over the years Congress has 
                                                                                                                   
A claim arising from the rejection, under section 365 of this title or under 
a plan under chapter 9, 11, 12, or 13 of this title, of an executory contract 
or unexpired lease of the debtor that has not been assumed shall be 
determined, and shall be allowed under subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this 
section or disallowed under subsection (d) or (e) of this section, the same 
as if such claim had arisen before the date of the filing of the petition. 
In re Cont’l Airlines, 981 F.2d at 1459-60 (citing Sanders v. City of Brady 
(In re Brady, Tex. Mun. Gas Corp.), 936 F.2d 212, 214 (5th Cir. 1991). 
177
 In re Modern Textile, Inc., 900 F.2d at 1191. 
178
 Section 365(n) requires licensees who decide to continue using the license 
despite rejection to continue paying royalties and to waive setoffs. 
179
 Andrew, supra note 24, at 866. 
180
 Id. at 870. 
27
Kreisman: Calling All Supreme Court Justices! It Might Be Time to Settle Th
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2012




attempted to clarify rejection, beginning with real property lessees.
181
 
After Lubrizol, Congress enacted Section 365(n) to protect intellectual 
property licensees from interpretations of Section 365(g) that, like 
Lubrizol, strip licenses from intellectual property licensees.
182
 
However, despite Section 365(n), trademark licensees were still at 
risk because trademarks were excluded from the provision.
183
 Then 
came Sunbeam. The Seventh Circuit used Sunbeam to provide a 
different interpretation of Section 365(g).
184
 Chief Judge Easterbrook 
properly rejected the Lubrizol interpretation, and instead held that 
rejection does not permit the rejecting party to recapture the licensed 
property.
185
 Under Sunbeam, Section 365(n) is not necessarily needed 
because the case held that rejection does not prevent the licensee from 
using the license. 
Licensors should be aware of how their circuit interprets Section 
365 when deciding whether to reject an executory contract, and even 
when negotiating a new license agreement. Licensees must also 
understand how courts interpret rejection in their circuits because if 
courts follow Lubrizol, they may have additional bargaining power, if 
the licensor is either a new company, or one in financial straits. 
Because the Supreme Court denied Sunbeam’s writ of certiorari to 
review the Seventh Circuit’s decision,
186
 it remains to be seen whether 
Congress will now step in to clarify rejection, include trademarks in 
Section 365(n), or do nothing at all.  
If Congress chooses to take no action, it will only lead to further 
confusion among the circuits. Ostensibly, other circuits will address 
this issue in the future and will need to decide for themselves what it 
means to reject an executory contract. While the Seventh Circuit and 
                                                 
181
 Id. at 867. 
182
 S. REP. NO. 100-505, at 3202-03 (1988). 
183
 Id. at 3204. 
184
 See generally Sunbeam Prods., Inc. v. Chi. Am. Mfg., LLC, 686 F.3d 372 
(7th Cir. 2012). 
185
 Id. at 377. 
186
 Order Denying Mot. Writ of Cert. Dec. 10, 2012. 
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scholars have criticized Lubrizol,
187
 it is still technically good law in 
the Fourth Circuit. Circuits that have not yet addressed this issue may 
interpret rejection in any manner they choose.  
Without any guidance from the Supreme Court, this issue will 
only be further muddled in the years to come. If other circuits choose 
not to follow Sunbeam’s reasoning, and instead base their decision on 
equity, then businesses looking to enter licensing agreements cannot 
be certain of how a court will interpret a possible rejection.  
Furthermore, this lack of consistency among the courts will lead 
to inefficient negotiations and, ultimately, license agreements. The 
possibility that the licensor may reject the agreement should be 
considered when negotiating license agreements. A licensee should be 
compensated for taking the risk of rejection if a court in that 
jurisdiction requires the licensee to give up the trademark. However, if 
a court rules that rejection does not prevent the licensee from using the 
trademark, then the licensee received a benefit that it did not bargain 
for or necessarily deserve. Without a consistent interpretation of 
rejection, contracting parties are unable to efficiently negotiate an 
agreement that benefits both sides. 
Despite the Supreme Court’s denial of Sunbeam’s writ of 
certiorari, it is important that the Supreme Court review what it means 
for a licensor to reject a trademark license. Perhaps in the near future 
the Supreme Court will settle this rejection business once and for all. 
                                                 
187
 Sunbeam, 686 F.3d at 377-78; Andrew, supra note 24, at 916-19; Jay 
Lawrence Westbrook, The Commission’s Recommendations Concerning the 
Treatment of Bankruptcy Contracts, 5 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 463, 470-72 (1997). 
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